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DOES SUBSIDIARITY REALLY MATIER? 
Renaud Dehousse • 
History is unpredictable. 1992 was to crown eight years of hard labour of 
the Community institutions, with the completion of the internal market and the 
launching of the European Union. Instead, the Community has been caught in 
one of the most severe crises it has ever had to face. The rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty by the Danish people and the narrow victory of the "yes" vote 
in the French referendum have shown that European integration was meeting 
with stronger resistence than expected at national level, while the monetary 
crisis of mid-September has cast a shadow on the prospects for monetary union. 
In this difficult situation, the subsidiarity concept appears as a cure for all 
the problems now faced by the Community. Today's political discourse is 
replete with references to the spirit an letter of subsidiarity. Encouraged by its 
recognition in the Maastricht Treaty, the Community institutions have engaged 
into a discussion on how such a principle could be given effect. The expectation 
'European University Institute, Florence, Italy. I am indebted to a number of persons for their 
comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. I wish to thank in particular Mr. Emile 
Noel, Principal of the European University Institute, Professors Brian Bercusson, Christian Joerges 
and Giandomenico Majone from the EUI, and Professor Joseph Weiler from Harvard Law School. 
I am also grateful to Michelle Everson, Research Associate at the EUI, for her assistance in revising 
this paper. Not all of them shared the views expressed in this piece; I alone am responsible for any 
shortcomings. 
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seems to be that this will help the Community to steer a new course in the years 
to come. 
Yet there is still no clear understanding of the actual scope of the 
subsidiarity principle, nor of the ways in which it could be used by the 
Community institutions. The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate on 
these two issues. Before examining the merits of the discussion, it is however 
useful to analyse the reasons that have led to the insertion of subsidiarity in the 
Treaty on European Union. 
I. From Subsidiary to Principal: The Rise of the Subsidiarity Principle 
The emergence of the subsidiarity principle, which has rapidly gained 
fame in Community circles, is a story worth telling.1 As is now widely known, 
the concept of subsidiarity has ancient roots in European political philosophy. 
It was mostly invoked - amongst others by the catholic church - as a J~~neral 
principle of soci~l_organization, to protect the private sphere against any undue 
--~--"-----~·'• -~o"" 
interference from the state, the latter being called upon to intervene only when 
action by private parties was unable to reach certain objectives. In some federal 
systems, the- same principle was u:-sed as a "rule of reason"2, to draw a line 
1See V. Constantinesco, La distribution des pouvoirs entre Ia Communaute et ses Etats 
membres: l' equilibre mouvant de la competence legislative et le principe de subsidiarite, report 
presented at the conference on "The Institutions of the Em'opean Community after the _Sin~e 
European Act: The New Procedures and the Capacity to Act. Balance Sheet and Perspecttves m 
View of the Intergovernmental Conferences", Bniges, 1990; M. Wilke and H. Wallace, Subsidiarity: 
Approaches to Power-Sharing in the European Community, RITA Discussion Paper N. 27 (1990). 
2Constantinesco, "La subsidiarite comme principe constitutionnel de I' integration europeenne", 
Aussenwirtschaft (1991) 439-459 at 447. 
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between the respective competences of the center and the component units: 
preference was to be given to action at a level as close as possible to the 
citizen.3 
Although some elements of the Community's institutional structure bore 
some resemblance to this approach,4 the concept was not used as such in 
reference to the Community until very recently. (Ji~~n__t?~-~~111_!1~r States' near 
total controi over the decision-making process, it was difficult to argue that their 
sovereign pow~r~-W~!"_t;;_.r_ea.lly_e!\ftap.~!~<!J?J'J~l1f.()p<::_a~~~~~~!~<:>?:· However, 
----------~------='--"~-C--
things were to change with the ~ingle __ ~~_:~_!'_e~~c!~\Vhich prov~ded one at the 
same time for a broadening of the Community's sphere of competence, and for 
a more _systematic _use ()LttJ-aj()rityvoting: not only was the Community 
increasingly to intervene in areas such as culture or environmental protection, 
where subnational bodies have traditionally been active but, equally importantly, 
it was now at times able to bypass the opposition of one or a few Member 
3 Article 72 (II) of the German Basic Law, for instance, provides that 
"The Federation shall have the right to legislate in ... matters [of concurrent 
competence] to the extent that a need for regulation by federal legislation exists 
because: 
1. a matter cannot be effectively regulated by the legislation of individual Lander, 
or 
2. the regulation of a matter by a Land law might prejudice the interest of other 
Lander or of the people as a whole, or 
3. the maintenance of legal or economic uniformity, especially the maintenance of 
uniformity of living conditions beyond the territory of any one Land, necessitates 
such regulation." Translation inA Blaustein and G. Flanz (eds.), Constitutions of the 
Countries of the World, (August 1991) at 110. 
4See Kapteyn, "Community Law and the Principle of Subsidiarity", Revue des affaires 
europeennes (1991) 35-43 at 38-39, who cites among other elements Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, 
the use of directives, which "leave to the national authorities the choice of forms and methods" 
whereby their objectives should be achieved (Article 189), the principle of proportionality. See also 
Constantinesco, supra note 31 and the report on the subsidiarity principle prepared by Mr. Giscard 
d'Estaing for the Institutional Committee of the European Parliament, Doc. EP A3-163/90 of 22 June 
and 4 July 1990. 
States. This combined developmenf offers a good illustration of the links 
existing between the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of federalism, 
discussed above. For the first time in the history of the Community, the fear of 
a centralist drift, occasionally inflamed by the behaviour of Community 
r\\ institutions6, became more than a rethorical statement in the mouths of a-
li handful of politicians. 
Centre-periphery problems of this kind are common in federal systems. 
Yet, at Community level, the problem is made somewhat more acute by the fact 
that the Co!l@_u!rityc~nj())'.S a. functional competence: several pr()visions enable 
~!-~~.2!~~-!!1~1!_~.Yr~e~+.ee.d~JQ .. I<.!i!~bJi~h It ~()Q111!()ll ~~!.k~t(~!£I,~s-~2_0. 
al!§.JQQAt Q~.s~pJ¥ !(). ~c~~':.~;()~te~ti'l:s of the Community" k\~~~!~}~.~: 
This has made possible a number of incursions into fields where the Community 
had not been granted a formal competence - hence the gradual extension of 
Community activities that was noted from the 1970s onwards. 
In this context, the .!dtea of,}t~~tgnJ~g .~lear..J.imits to the growth of 
(:o£!1Illunjty.powe£S rapidly g~e(Lgroun't Unsurprisingly, the Single Act 
contained a first reference to the subsidiarity principle: in the field of 
environmental policy, the Community was to act only "to the extent that the 
objectives [of environmental policy] can be attained better at Community level 
5The importance of which is stressed in Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe", 100 Yale Law 
Journal (1991) 2403-2483. 
6See the criticisms of Hailbronner, "Legal Institutional Reform of the EEC: What can we Leam 
from Federalism Theory and Practice?", Aussenwimhchaft (1991) 485-496. The fears of the German 
Lander were expressed forcefully in the Bundesrat at the time of ratification of the Single Act. See 
Hrbek, "The German Lander and the European Community. Towards a Real Federalism?" in W. 
Wessels and E. Regelsberger (eds.), The Federal Republic of Germany and the European 
Community: The Presidency and Beyond (1988) 215. 
than at the level of the individual Member States"7• Representatives of 
European regions subsequently claimed that subsidiarity should be enshrined 
within the treaty, while they should be granted the power to initiate proceedings 
against Community acts adopted in violation of this principle. 8 In the course of 
the intergovernmental conference, the idea of formal recognition was supported 
both by the Commission, eager to give evidence of its own moderation, and by 
some Member States, alarmed by the seemingly endless growth of Community 
powers. For a majority of actors in the Community process, subsidiarity had thus 
become a principal concern. 
This broad consensus was not flawless, and occasionally led to curious 
contrasts: the implications of subsidiarity in the field of monetary policy were, 
for example, radically opposed, depending on whether they were identified by 
the United Kingdom or by the Commission.9 Be that as it may, the convergence 
of divergent interests once again had a strong im:t:~~!on the_outcome of the 
negotiations. The very first provision of the ~aastricht Treaty states that 
decisions are to be !aken "as ~l()~e!)'_ a~ p~ssible to the citizen". How this result 
is to be achieved is explained in Artic;le ~B, which formally establishes two 
rules which up to now had enjoyed the status of general principles of 
Community constitutional law: tl!~ principle of attributed pow~rs10 . and the 
~. - • - ,' -- - - · - - - - ' -- -- .-, ~~o;_""'-,·-·o-~--0.~ 
7 Article 130R ( 4). 
8See the motion adopted by the Assembly of European Regions in December 1990, Regions of 
Europe (2/1990) at 56-59. 
9See F. Dehousse, "La·subsidiarite, fondement constitutionnel ou paravent politique de l'Union 
europeenne?", Liber Amicorum E. Krings (1990) 51-59. 
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"The Community shall act within the linrits conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the 
objectives assigned to it therein." 
6 
j~!,in~~~,££2~2,~tx!1• Subsidiarity proper is defined in paragraph ~.of 
th; ~;~~-p~o;i~io;, which is worth quoting in full as the wording is of 
importance: 
"In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and 
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community." 
The redundancies in these few statements hint at just how eager national 
governments were to protect their prerogatives against any undesired Community 
intrusion. This concern is also reflected in the wording of Article 3B. In theory, 
subsidiarity could have been used as a double-edged sword: negatively, to 
protect Member States' prerogatives against undue Community interference; but 
also positively, to allow the Community to act should such action appear 
necessary.12 Yet, only the negative formulation was retained in the final 
version: as it stands, Article 3B might be invoked to regulate the use the 
Community makes of its competences, but not to grant it additional powersP 
This, it is submitted, is a precise resume of the political objectives this provision 
is meant to achieve. 
11
"Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty." 
12Such was the spirit of Article 235, as uuderlined among others by President Delors in an 
address ai the European Institute of Public Administration. See "Le principe de subsidiarite: 
contribution au debat" ~ Subsidiarite: deft du changement (1991) 7 -19. 
13This negative overtone was reinforced during the intergovermental conference. The 
conclusions of the Rome European Couucil acknowleged that subsidiarity could justify an extension 
of Community competence (see Bull. EC 12-1990 at 11). The draft circulated by the Luxembourg 
Presidency contained a milder version of Article 3B, according to which the Community could act 
"if and insofar as those objectives can be better achieved by the Community than by the member 
States acting separately". The Luxembourg draft has been reprinted in Europe Documents N. 
1722/1723 of 5 July 1991. 
II. The Subsidiarity Tests of Article 3B 
'The scope of Article 3B confirms the above interpretation. Firstly, 
although subsidiarity has been raised to the level of general principle of the 
European Union, Article 3B appears in the EC Treaty rather than in the common 
provisions, which suggests that Community competences were the primary 
target. Secondly, the use by the Community of its exclusive compe~te_nces is not 
-·-ceo_~,.-~-~ < .- • • -
ggyerne_ci by tb,e _s:ubsidiariJ)' principle, This seems logical: whenever the 
- -- . ·-c.. -
Community is under an obligation to act, and the Member States are deprived 
;;'-·------,-·- - -- '- • •-c -
of the necessary powers, there c:an be no question of subsidiarity. The 
demarcation of competences is determined by the Treaty itself, and the principle 
of attributed powers - reaffirmed in the first paragraph of Article 3B - is 
designed to protect the Member States against too generous a reading of 
Community powers. 
Subsidiarity proper will therefore be of importance in relation to powers 
that are shared between the Community and the Member States. At first sight, 
Article 3B seems to envisage a twofold. "subs~~!i!X~ .. !~.~t=. ~·. 
- in the first place, attention must be paid to the means available at national 
level, to see whether they might suffice to attain the objectives of the measure 
which is envisaged at Community level. This may entail a review of financial 
resources as well as legal instruments, of potential as well as existing measures. 
- the second test entails an evaluation of the envisaged Community action, in 
order to determine whether "by reason of the scale or the effects of the proposed 
8 
action", its objectives can be "better achieved" at Community level. This is what 
the Commission has labelled a "value added test"14• 
These two tests seem to refer to two different types of operation. Th~J'i!~t 
appears closer to a _lil~re ffffec;tJY!E!!J}§s_)est: ~ action at11~tional level is capable 
o~pr()d~cing the desired result, _it should be given preference. In contrast, the 
~~c:ppd _t~st is more concernt~d. about efficiency matters: .!l!~.J:eft:I~Il£<! tQ. tb.e fact 
that the objective has to be "better achi~v~d" at Community level can be seen 
as a indication that a comparative evaluation of the costs and benefits of action 
at COmmunitianiat national level is required. 
...:·' .c---·"""-~ ~'-'0-''·.- ··--.>.-"~ ·.;-.,.:-. 
It has been suggested that each of these two conditions are to be satisfied 
before the Community might act.15 But the two tests cannot be combined in a 
mechanical fashion. If one opts for the effectiveness test, two things are 
possible: either action at national level can be effective, and the Member States 
should act, or it is not. In this latter case, adding a separate efficiency condition 
does not really make sense: provided it itself is effective, Community action is 
likely to be more efficient than ineffective national measures. 
The legislative history of Article 3B may aid to understand how this 
ambiguous result was reached. The Luxembourg draft referred to "objectives ... 
better achieved by the Community than by the Member States acting 
separately" .16 This suggests that the Member States had in mind a comparative 
14The Principle of Subsidiarity, Communication of the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, Doc. SEC(92)1990 final of 27 October 1992 at p. 10 of the armex. 
15See the memorandum on subsidiarity presented by the Federal Republic of Germany, reported 
in Agence Europe of 12-13 October 1992 at 13-14. 
16See supra note 13. 
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assessment of national and Community measures, which can only be done 
through an evaluation of their respective efficiency. As indicated above, some 
felt it necessary to strengthen this wording by indicating that in such a case that 
national action proved "sufficient" to attain the pursued objective (read: where 
it would be as efficient as the proposed Community action), it should be given 
preference. 
Thus, rather than two distinct conditions, what we have here are but two 
facets of the same problem, effectiveness being a necessary component of the 
efficiency assessment which subsidiarity entails. Naturally, the complexity of the 
exercise has clear implications for the way the subsidiarity principle is to be 
implemented. 
Ill. Implementing Snbsidiarity 
Article 3b has already given rise to a fierce debate on the implementation 
of the subsidiarity principle. Is it "justiciable", i.e. could the European Court of 
Justice annul a Community act on the basis of an infraction against the 
subsidiarity principle? Should it assume such a delicate duty? Are there any 
alternatives to judicial implementation? I shall deal with these three questions 
in succession. 
Before doing so, however, a word of caution is necessary, for law is 
rarely as neutral as it claims to be, and the answers that most naturally come to 
mind are often inspired by political-institutional preferences. Hidden normative 
statements then tend to obfuscate the discussion. In my view, the best way to 
facilitate the debate is to eschew a supposedly "neutral" viewpoint, according to 
which problems are treated as if they were essentially technical ones, and rather 
to spell out as clearly as possible the kind of considerations that underlie our 
reasonings. This is what I shall try to do in the following pages. 
1. Is Subsidiarity Justiciable? 
That subsidiarity could be invoked in annulment proceedings, a~ainst 
·--~""~":!1--..,_._;J-""''',~·?-_, ____ ~-'"--.,,-~~'-"''~u>--.A- - -· . · ,---:""<-,- .' 
Community acts is beyond doubt. During the intergovernmental conference, 
·;~~ght h;~lbee~ given to the idea of refering to subsidiarity in the preamble of 
the Treaty. Yet, as we saw, another solution prevailed and subsidiarity, being 
mentioned in body of the Treaty, is to be regarded as binding on all Community 
- -
institutions. Any violation ofthep_Jj~~iple could therefore serve ~s_ a basis ~or 
: a;ulme~; ~ro~eedingbased onAr;icle 173 of the EC Treaty. A Member 
Stat~having unsuccesfull~ o;posed the adoption of a given measure, which it 
deemed to be in conflict with the subsidiarity principle, could thus subsequently 
bring the matter before the Court. 
However, it is far from certain in my view that private parties could do 
so, for the Court might find it difficult to regard Article 3b as sufficiently clear 
and precise to enjoy direct effect. In the past, it has denied direct effect to 
• • • . • • . 17 Treaty provisions that leave a Wide discretwn to Commumty mstit:utwns. 
Such is undoubtedly the case of Article 3b, the ambiguities of which are 
discussed above. 
17see for instance case 74/76, Iannelli v. Meroni, [1977] ECR 557 as regards state aids. While 
admitting the difficulty, Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-President of the EC Commission.' has expressed the 
hope that Article 3b will one day be held directly applicable. See the text of his Robert Schuman 
lecture at the European University Institute, Europe Documents N. 1786 of 18 June 1992 at 3. 
In spite of this reservation, it seems likely that the Court will one day be 
confronted with a subsidiarity problem. How will it tackle it? 
The difficulty is twofold. From a functional viewpoint, it is not clear that 
the Court is equipped to answer the question it would be asked. From a political 
' viewpoint, a ruling on the compatibility of a given measure with the subsidiarity 
principle could create a legitimacy problem. Although the two problems are 
closely intertwined, it is better to treat them separately. 
Functional Issue 
Subsidiarity as defined by the Treaty is a complex issue, which goes 
beyond classical competence problem, in relation to which courts must rule on 
the compatibility of a measure with rules governing the division of power 
between the center and the periphery. Rather, what would be required of the 
Court is an assessment of the adequacy of the means used to reach a given end: 
was Community action really necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
challenged measure, or would action at national level have represented a valid 
alternative? 
The answer to such a question involves a delicate qualitative assessment, 
and the parameters to be used are far from clear. Suppose for instance that the 
Council were to set up a programme providing for financial assistance for 
projects aiming to increase the mobility of school teachers. At first sight, such 
a measure would seem to fall squarely within the limitative framework of 
Article 126. Assume further, however, that the validity of this programme were 
to be challenged by one Member State, arguing that Community action was not 
12 
necessary since the same objective could equally have been achieved by the 
Member States, either acting individually or pqoling their resources to finance 
specific programmes, and that the Community had therefore violated the 
subsidiarity principle. 
How could the Court assess the merits of such claim? This would differ 
gratly from traditional litigation on the demarcation of competences, as the 
Court would be unable to refer to a superior norm, against which the validity of 
Community action could be checked. 
Article 3b seems to suggest that the Court should attempt to determine 
whether national action would have been sufficient. But what sort of parameters 
should it use in order to ascertain the efficiency of national measures, some of 
which might even exist in project form only? 
Even assuming that the Court were able to overcome this first difficulty, 
on what basis would it then further decide whether national actions would be 
"sufficiently" efficient to attain the objectives of the measure under scrutiny? 
Obviously, this involves more than an effectiveness assessment. What would be 
required is a ~~~~fui_~~!~~~!LliP of _t~e cost~)!}J:tthe benefits of the proposed 
Community measure, when compared withthose of national action. 
~~'hr·,;-\""""~-'-~;~__.,....._,,.o ~, •. __ ,,,_::."--~--~ -- --·"'-~ .-_,_-;_ _-_co·_--.-s ···"'' ----- -,._.,----:_:· ,.e·_o:~·:>> ··--·· -"":::C--;""":-~;:-
Article 3B indicates that in the evaluation process, due regard should be 
paid to "the scale of effects of the proposed action". The first criterion may be 
understood as a reference to the transfrontier dimensions of a given problem. As 
regards the second one, the Commission has suggested also considering such 
13 
factors as the costs of inaction, or the need to reach a critical mass.18 But, 
leaving these attempts to provide objective criteria aside, what will ultimately 
be needed is a ruling on the compared efficiency of both types of measure. 
Is this really a task which can be fulfilled by a judicial body? Will the 
Court have at its disposal the necessary elements to provide an answer? It 
would, of course, be able to rely on the submissions of private parties, but these 
are likely to contain considerations informed by political opportunism than by 
scientific evidence. And the problem is made even more complex by the 
relativity of the efficiency concept: costs and benefits might be different for all 
interested parties. Suppose for instance that the costs of the proposed 
Community action are found to be evenly distributed among the Member States, 
while its benefits accrue only to some of them. Will the fact that inaction would 
entail even greater costs be deemed sufficient to justify Community action? 
In other words, a_S.):!~s_idiarity_assessment appears to involve delicate 
,;'.•·• • -- =>• -, ~ •- _,. ~ ·''-· -.·H" .. -'-'- •• ~:0~-o-._<"~-~~-~-- -' '-_::- ·- .,_.,c.· .. • ~--.--:_: ~-"0 "o-• 
1'2-!icy_choices, v.:_hich go beyond the tasks traditionally assigned to judicial 
-~----- -,.--.,..~::-->:~·-:c:•r--•'"':"" '~·--:.';;;:;-,-,'-:'i''-' · .. ;.:-~;.~-.;:-'-"'--c',_-. .,,__:L - -·- _.~<-·.·:::5'"-• ~- •--··--'">-2.•", ···'"'-:-- "' - -·., -- •·-
bodies.19 
Vigorously pleading in favour of justiciability, Jacque and Weiler have 
invoked an analogy with the proportionality principle to suggest that the 
18Communication on the subsidiarity principle, supra note 14 at 10. 
19See however Kapteyn, supra note 4 at 40, who argues that criteria such as a "more effective 
attainment" or the "cross-boundary dimension or effect" or a given problem "can be the subject of 
a discussion based on more objective criteria of an economic, social, technical or legal nature". 
14 
European Court of Justice had already touched upon similar issues on other 
occasions.20 
The similarity is indeed striking: both principles are used in order to 
regulate the use of Community competences, with a view to limiting any 
encroachment upon certain elements which are given a "superior" value: 
fundamental rights and basic freedoms contained in the Treaty in the case of the 
proportionality principle, Member States' competences in the case of the 
subsidiarity principle. Both principles also require an assessment of the 
appropriateness of the means used to reach a given end. 
Yet, the parallel is by no means complete. Proportionality problems are 
essentially limited to a question of means and ends: could not other measures, 
equally effective but less detrimental to superior interests, have been used? In 
contrast, as I have tried to show, subsidiarity problems involve a difficult 
efficiency assessment. Moreover, the efficiency of Community measures is to 
be assessed relatively, in comparison with that of alternative national measures. 
The Commission has even suggested that proportionality is but one dimension 
of any subsidiarity assessment;21 it is indeed likely that a Community 
intervention going beyond what is necessary to achieve one objective of the 
Treaty would not be found to be efficient. All this makes the subsidiarity review 
a far more delicate exercise - politically as well as functionally. 
20Jacque and Weiler, "On the Road to European Union- A New Judicial Architecture", 27 CML 
Rev. (1991) 185-207. 
21comrnunication on the subsidiarity principle, supra note 14 at 5. 
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Despite this important difference, the Court's jurisprudence on the 
proportionality principle is highly instructive.22 Two elements are worthy of 
""""""'-:;" ~ ~ "- -----<-'"">,~""-<~- ---- ""-"'"" 
particular attention. Firstly, although the scope of the principle has gradually 
been expanded to cover the entire field of Community law, including rules 
adopted by the Council and the Commission as well as individual administrative 
deCisions, the vast majority of measures subjected I() re:view _l:lave been 
---·" -'-~~·•"•~•'c=-..::0·.·--···-':..--~-•--'"' "F : -, ,-"'·,..-· •-- •-
Commission regulations, "which can be said to straddle the border be~een the 
rules a~d the ad;ptlon of administrative measures"?3 The way 
-t'""h-~e~C~-o---u--rt-----h'--a--s-'u''"n~-d ___ e,;t~k~~-this"'re~ie~'fs-'eqi'ia:Jl:y'lfiterestmg. In assessing whether 
a Community measure was suited to the purpose of achieving the objective 
pursued, the Court has always shown great caution when the Treaty provided the 
Community legislator with a wide margin of discretion; it has generally confined 
itself to examining whether the m~-~~~!£J!U~~~!!- \V.a.s:~qQ:yioiJ.slxJnappropriate 
-~"'~~·-"""~"""'='"'"""""'--.'"•=·""-~~----~~~--~- -
i~~Jile ~~~lis~ti()I!K9Ll~~ d~~if!'~JL9i:li~£,tiye"24• This clearly suggests that the 
Court, being aware of the difficulty involved in determining the effectiveness of 
a given measure, was reluctant to substitute its own appreciation for that of the 
Community legislator, excepting those cases of blatant unsuitability. 
The Court has showed a similar reticence on other occasions. In the 
notorious ERTA case25, the Court ruled that it was for the Council, when acting 
on the basis of Article 235, to determine when Community action was in fact 
"necessary" to attain one of the Community's objectives. Likewise, in case 
22See J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law (1992) at 708-866 for a detailed review. 
23/bid., at 861. 
24Case 40/70, Schroeder v. Germany [1973] ECR 138 at 142. 
25Case 22/70, Commission v. Coullcil, [1971] ECR 263. 
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276/80,26 it was asked to rule that, by establishing quotas to combat against the 
steel crisis of the late 1970s, the Commission had infringed Art 58 (1) of the 
ECSC Treaty, which provides that quotas should be used as an ultima ratio. The 
plaintiff argued that Article 57, which invites the Commission to give preference 
to "the indirect means of action at its disposal, such as ... cooperation with 
Governments to regularize or influence general consumption" or intervention in 
regard to prices, provided sufficient means to deal with the crisis. In other 
words, the Court was confronted with a kind of subsidiarity challenge ante 
letteram. In its ruling, it simply noted that 
[i]n the event of a manifest crisis Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty 
confers upon the Commission a wide power of appraisal which it 
exercised in adopting Decision No 2794/80/ECSC. The 
Commission has set out the reasons for which it considered that the 
means of action provided for in Article 57 were not sufficient to 
deal with the crisis. It considered that it could not take steps to 
influence general consumption in the present economic situation. 
( ... )The Commission accordingly concluded that the indirect means 
of action at its disposal had proved insufficient and that it was 
necessary to intervene directly in order to restore the balance 
between supply and demand. In arriving at this conclusion the 
Commission did not exceed the limits to its power of appraisal and 
the submission must therefore be rejected. "27 
Thus, the Court seems to have considered that, the Commission having 
complied with the (formal) requirement of a statement of the reasons on which 
its actions were based, all it could do itself as concerns the merits of the 
problem was to make sure the Commission had acted within the limits of its 
powers. This reasoning had been explicitly developped in an earlier case, 
26Ferriera Padana v. Commission, [1982] ECR 517. 
27Ibid. at 540. 
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where the validity of a Commission regulation modifying monetary 
compensatory amounts following the temporary withdrawal of the French franc 
from the European monetary "snake" was questioned: 
"As the evaluation of a complex economic situation is involved, the 
Commission and the Management Committee enjoy, in this respect, 
a wide measure of discretion. In reviewing the legality of the 
exercise of such discretion, the Court must confine itself to 
examining whether it contains a manifest error or constitutes a 
misuse of power or whether the authority did not clearly exceed the 
bounds of its discretion. "28 
This line of reasoning suggests that where the Treaty leaves a margin of 
discretion to other Community institutions, the Court is not eager to substitute 
its own interpretation for theirs, If such a line is maintained, the Court will 
approach with great caution any discussion on the conformity of Community 
measures with the subsidiarity principle, and leave a large measure of discretion 
to the institutions that must decide on the matter; only in exceptional 
circumstances would its scrutiny lead to a negative judgement.29 
b. The Legitimacy Issue 
What the Court will do will in the last instance depends on how it 
conceives of its institutional mission. In this respect, the fact that the subsidiarity 
principle has been enshrined in the body of the Treaty is likely to carry some 
weight. In doing so, did not the Member States implicitly invite the Court to 
28Case 29/77, Raquette v. France, [1977] ECR 1835, recitals 19 and 20. See also case 42/84, 
Remia-Nutricia [1985] ECR 2545, recital 43. 
29See Kapteyn, supra, note 4 at 41. See also Mischa, "Un nouveau r<He pour Ia Cour de 
Justice?", RMC (1990) 681-686. 
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come to grips with the problem? Alternately, enforcing the subsidiarity principle 
might be prove difficult for a Court that has systematically construed Treaty 
provisions in a broad manner, having regard to their purposes and to the overall 
objectives of the Treaty30• Clearly, teleological interpretation and subsidiarity 
are inspired by diametrically considerations, and will be difficult to reconcile. · 
Removing now from the analytical to the, more delicate, level of 
normative consideration, I should submit that the Court would be well advised 
to stick to the cautious appoach it has followed in the past. Such a view is of 
course influenced by the above analysis: if subsidiarity is primarily a political 
~-~~--_,_.,~,~"·····-~-·~~-"''""'~-'-'"-~"'-""''"'"'"-"'-~'--->~-~,.-~"~-·= 
problem, as I believe it is, judicial solutions may create a legitimacy problem. 
Assuming tha.i- a majority of Member ~tates - or_ even all of them - have 
assessed the relative efficiency ofvari9JJS modes qf action, and decided upon the 
- .. -_.___ -- - -- - .. ·-- __ -, .. '.,_, - "- . _.' " 
course to be followed, would it belegitirJ:l~!efor.t)!e Gourt to :\Inpose a differt;:nt 
-, -· .-, -:,_•-·,- ·- -. • -C 
evaluation of such action? 
The upholders of justiciability have stressed that there have been many 
examples of courts having been called upon to exert a creative role when 
implementing general principles to politically delicate issues. After all, deciding 
when life)fegins in matters of abortion is no less difficult a task than deciding 
I 
at which level a given measure is more effective; yet, courts have often been 
entrusted with these tasks.31 
3
°For an recent example of a this trend, see opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991 (EEA 
Agreement), not yet reported, and the comments of Brandtner, "The 'Drama' of the EEA: Comments 
on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92" 3 EJIL (1992) 300-328 
31This is the example used by Jacque and Weiler, supra note 20 at 205. 
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This is of course true, but the analogy is not entirely convincing. Firstly, 
it would be easy to show that the legitimacy of such decisions has been 
questioned, at times vehemently. Secondly, European states have strongly 
contrasting views as to the role of the judiciary. Several of them were 
powerfully influenced by the political philosophy of the Enlightenment, which 
insisted on keeping judges away from politics in the name of the separation of 
powers. Even if constitutional justice has made considerable headway in post-
World War II Europe, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative acts 
remain limited in several Member States of the Community. Thirdly, and 
perhaps more importantly, even assuming that where courts undertake such 
delicate tasks, their own legitimacy is well established, it is far from sure that 
the intervention of the European Court of Justice would be regarded equally 
benevolently. Recent evidence suggests that many Irish citizens had more faith 
in their own High Court than in the Luxembourg Court when it came to dealing 
with the abortion issue. There is, in other words, a serious risk that, by 
intervening in discussions of a clearly political nature, the European Court of 
Justice would awaken the ghost of a "gouvernement des juges", in a Community 
which is already under strong attack for its legitimacy deficit. 
Turning to federal systems, one notices that courts have often showed 
great caution in deploying the legal instruments put at their disposal to protect 
the prerogatives of component units. This is all the more interesting as some of 
these instruments would have appeared to be easier to handle than is Article 3b. 
The Tenth Amendment of the United States' Constitution, for instance, states 
that 
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United states by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people." 
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Altough clearly atuned to the subsidiarity principle, tbis provision might have 
been more readily used by courts, as it does not entail any effectiveness 
assessment. Yet, after having .hesitated for a while, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has refused to see in this clause an instrument delineating "islands 
of sovereignty"32 protected against any kind of federal interference.33 
The reasons wbich led the Court to reject tbis possibility are worth noting. 
Reporting for the majority, Justice Blackmun recalled that defining a priori the 
nature and content of limitations on federal authority under the Commerce 
clause had proven problematic for courts. He then added: 
"It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal 
Government was designed in large part to protect the States from 
overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus gave the States a role 
both in the selection both of the Executive and the Legislative 
Branches of the Federal Government. ( ... ) In short, the Framers 
chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on 
federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings 
of the National Government itself, rather than in the discrete 
limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign 
interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural 
safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by 
judicially created limitations on federal powers. 34 
This, however, should not be seen as undermining the constitutional position of 
the States: 
"Of course, we continue to recognise that the States occupy a 
special and specific position in our constitutional system and that 
the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must 
reflect that position. But the principal and basic limit on the federal 
commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action - the 
3~. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985) 137. 
33Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US (1985) 528. 
34/bid. at 551-552 (emphasis added). 
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built-in restraints that our system provides through state 
participation in federal governmental action. The political process 
ensures that laws that unduly burden the states will not be 
promulgated. 35 
The Australian High Court had reached a similar conclusion -although for 
different reasons - as early as 1920.36 In Germany, the Federal Constitutional 
Court has refused to give too strict an interpretation to Article 72 (II) of the 
Basic Law, which governs federal intervention in areas of concurrent 
competences.37 Such a convergence would seem to give some credit to those 
who hold that in divided-power systems, the most effective defences against 
centralizing pressures are to be found in the political process, rather than in the 
judiciary.38 If this is true for federal systems, should it not be so a fortiori in 
the Community system, where Member States enjoy greater powers? Defining 
at what level a task is better accomplished is primarily a political problem; it 
should therefore be left to the political process. 
IV. Alternatives to Judicial Implementation 
Rejecting justiciability does not necessarily imply that subsidiarity is 
condemned to remain an empty concept. Implementing the (binding) guidelines 
contained in Article 3b requires an effort on the part of all institutions. Thus, if 
35 Ibid. at 556. 
36Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., 28 CLR (1920) 128. 
37 see the analysis in Constantinesco, supra note 30. 
38See Wechsler, "The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rille of the States in the 
Selection and Composition of the National Government", 54 Columbia Law Review (1954) 543-560. 
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one accepts Justice Blackmun's view that protecting States' rights is primarily 
a matter of process,39 the impact of this provision on the Community 
legislative process is potentially more important than the justiciability issue.40 
The Commission should play a central role in this respect, because it still 
holds a monopoly of initiative in most fields of Community competence and is, 
of all Community institutions, by far the best equipped to fulfill the evaluation 
task which is needed. One might therefore envisage the establishment within the 
Commission of a specialised unit, attached to the Secretariat-General, which 
would act as a clearing house and review all draft measures prepared by 
Commission services in order to assess their conformity with the subsidiarity 
principle. 41 
Procedures can play a useful rOle in ensuring the rationality of decision-
making. Requiring that each Commission proposal be accompanied a specific 
subsidiarity assessment will provide a strong incentive to address the questions 
raised by Article 3B.42 It might even be argued that the statement of reasons 
imposed by Article 190 for all Community measures should lead the 
Commission to include in the recital of its proposals an indication of the 
39 Garcia v. San Antonio, supra note 33 at 554. 
40See Brittan, supra note 17 at 3. 
41This . proposal 1S developped at greater length in Dehousse, Joerges, Majone and Snyder, 
Europe after 1992- New Regulatory Strategies, EUI Working Papers in Law, N. 92/31 at 38-41. 
4~ possibility is contemplated in the Commission's communication on subsidiarity, supra 
note 14 at 21. 
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efficiency considerations that have led to their adoption.43 Conformity with this 
·formal requirement could of course be subjected to the Court's scrutiny. 
Specific safeguards for Member States' interests might also be useful. 
They could be placed within specific procedures. The European Parliament's 
Draft Treaty on European Union envisaged for example that any intervention in 
fields previously untouched by the Community would be possible only through 
enactment of an organic law, with more stringent voting requirements.44 Such 
is also the spirit of "old" Article 235, which requires unanimity for the 
Community to act when the necessary powers are not provided by the Treaty. 
Mechanisms of this kind would provide the Member States with means to resist 
unwelcome interference in their sphere of activity. They would also provide 
evidence of the Community's unwillingness to tolerate a creeping centralisation. 
As hinted above, the most immediate threat to the principle lies in 
majority voting. There have been in the past instances of measures adopted by 
the Council (generally in the framework of internal market policy, where one 
can rely upon the generous wording of Article lOOA) against the opposition of 
one or more Member States, who argued that the action envisaged went beyond 
what subsidiarity required.45 No matter how rare they may be, situations of this 
kind feed the fear of an ever-growing Community. Obviously, the current rules 
of procedure of the Council, which provide that voting is possible when a 
43 An commitment to this effect has been taken by the Commission at the Lisboa meeting of 
the European Council, in June 1992. 
44See Article 12 of the Draft Treaty. According to Article 38, organic laws would have required 
a qualified majority both in Council and in Parliament, whereas "normal" provisions required an 
absolute majority only. 
45This was the case for directive 89/662 on cigarette labelling (OJ 1359 of 8 December 1989), 
adopted in spite of the opposition of the British Government. 
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majority of members of the Council so decide46, did not suffice to prevent this 
from happening. Some sort of remedy should therefore be found. 
One could conceivably argue that, as unanimity represents the best 
possible guarantee for Member States' interests, all one should do in order to 
avoid this kind of problem is return to the spirit of the Luxembourg agreement, 
and provide that whenever one Member State deems subsidiarity to have been 
ignored by a proposed measure, no vote should be taken until a satisfactory 
compromise can be found on this point. This institutional approach would even 
find support in the works of some economists, who argue that unanimity is the 
most appropriate rule for decisions on the efficiency of public policies.47 Yet, 
as no control of the use made by the Member States of this prerogative would 
be possible, the costs of such a solution would be likely to greatly outweigh its 
benefits: Community decision-making could experience anew the "lourdeur" of 
the pre-Single Act years, and the Community would find it more or less 
impossible to tackle the many problems it is now faced with. 
Effective remedies should therefore steer away from the Charibdys of 
inaction and the Scylla of Luxembourg. 
One possible solution would be to provide that when a significant 
minority in the Council (say, three Member States, possibly representing a 
minimum number of votes in the Council48) deems a proposed measure to be 
46Article 5 of the Council's Rules of Procedure, OJ 1291 of 17 October 1987. 
47This point is developed in Majone, "Le scelte pubbliche e le nuove tecnologie", XX 
Amministrare (1990) 255-292. 
47his number should however remain below the treshold needed for a blocking minority, 
otherwise the guarantee would be fallacious. 
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in conflict with the subsidiarity principle, any decision on this point is deferred 
for a limited period, after which the matter will be examined by the "General 
Affairs" Council, which will then decide according to normal procedures. Such 
a mechanism could even be made binding through its insertion into the rules of 
procedure of the Council. 
Similar mechanisms exist in some federal constitutions where, in order to 
protect their own interests, minorities are given the right to render certain 
decisions more difficult by increasing the level of consensus needed for their 
adoption.49 In the Community context, this solution could be viewed as an 
acceptable compromise by all interested parties. 
On the one hand, it would provide additional guarantees to those who fear 
an uncontrolled growth of Community power. It has often been argued that 
some overregulatory tendencies were simply due to attempts by national officials 
to secure in Brussels decisions which they were unable to force through in their 
own country. Resort to a more politicized body might make this more difficult, 
by ensuring that the institutional dimensions of the problem are duly considered. 
On the other hand, a Luxembourg-type drift would also seem less likely. 
Voting conditions being maintained, minority action would not entirely prevent 
the ultimate adoption of any measure by the Community, which would instead 
simply be deferred. Moreover, as several national governments would be 
49Thls is for instance the case of the so-called "alarm bell procedure" established by Article 
38bis of the Belgian Constitution. This procedure enables three quarters of the members of one of 
the linguistic groups in each Chamber to prevent the adoption of a draft bill which might "have a 
serious effect on relations between the communities". In such a case, the procedure is sup ended and 
the matter referred to the Council of Ministers, which comprises Flemish and French-speaking 
members in equal number. 
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required to concur in their evaluation of the proposed measure before this 
procedure might be used, the risk that the whole decision-making process be 
undermined by a systematic resort to this minority action would appear to be 
fairly limited. The expectation is rather that, given the various checks and 
balances entailed in such a mechanism, all parties would have an incentive to 
reach a compromise, so that the ultimate decision may be made by consensus. 5° 
Naturally, majority decisions might as a result be more difficult, which 
could somewhat slow down decision-making. This, however, would be the price 
to pay to implement the subsidiarity principle. 
Would this suffice? Some might argue that subsidiarity should be 
construed as a broader principle, which aims not only to preserve a certain 
degree of decentralization, but also to ensure the efficiency and the equity of the 
policy choices that will be made at Community level. Viewed in this light, the 
above-mentioned mechanisms might appear biased in favour of the institutional 
interests of the Member States. After all, states are far from being the only 
actors interested in efficiency matters. Should the constitutionalization of 
subsidiarity operated by the Maastricht Treaty not be seen as an invitation to a 
bolder construction? 
In my view, the answer ought to be negative. Even leaving aside the 
question of remedies available for such a claim, I do not believe that the resort 
5
<lt is worth noting that although the Belgian "alarm bell" procedure referred to above was 
vi~we~ as_ an imp~rtant guarant_ee when it was established, it was used only once, in a relatively 
mmor mCJdent. It IS therefore vtewed by most commentators as having mainly a dissuasive effect. 
See e.g. A. Alen (ed.), Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law (1992) at 81. 
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to an ultimate umpire represents an ideal solution. As indicated above, 
~l:IIJ.s!ci!arity, becauseitis primarily concerned with questions of efficiency, does 
not lend itself to judicial treatment, save in extreme cases. Policy choices are to 
be made by political bodies, and not hidden behind pseudo neutral questions. 
The primary task of legal structures is to ensure that these choices are made on 
as rational and equitable a basis as possible. Tb.is result can only be achieved by 
a~.~~E~~~is .~.n;}!!.~~:dl!.~:.~:which o~~::l~~.!P.~.P~!icyJ)r9sestb. ilJld. presenre the 
rights of minorities. 
The emphasis on protecting Member States' interests appears more 
legitimate in this light. Such was after all the rationale whl.ch led to the 
enshrinment of subsidiarity in the Treaty, as rightly or wrongly, it was felt that 
the present strucuture contained the seeds of a centralist drift. Morevover, in 
subsidiarity debates, national governments are likely to be exposed to pressures 
from those who have an interest in the issue at hand, be it institutional (as in the 
case of subnatioal units) or substantive, as in the case of the interest groups. 
Granting a specific protection to states' rights goes therefore beyond the mere 
problem of preserving the specific interests of national governments in the 
Community system. 
V. Conclusion: Does Subsidiarity Really Matter?51 
Important as subsidiarity may be as a political issue, stimulating as the 
technical problems raised by its implementation undoubtedly are, its true 
51This section draws largely on Dehousse, "Autonomie regionale et integration europeenne: les 
le<;ons de !'experience communautaire", in 0. Jacot-Guillarmod (ed.), The EEA Agreement -
Comments and Reflexions (1992) at 693-705. 
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importance for the Community should not be exagerated. Indeed, irrespective of 
the attempt to give flesh to it in the Treaty,52 I would argue that the 
subsidiarity concept is ill-adapted to the problems it is meant to solve. 
To be understood, this remark should be viewed in relation to the overall 
evolution of federal systems. The traditional vision of federalism, which has for 
so long influenced judiciary constructs, was characterized by the view that a 
clear line should be drawn between the respective competences of the center and 
the periphery. However, this dualism has been challenged by the contemporary 
evolution of federal systems: the increased complexity of industrial societies and 
the growth of government intervention have lead to a growing interpenetration 
between the action of both levels of government. 
Institutionally, this interdependence has been reflected in the growth of 
intergovernmental relations. Instances of intergovernmnental cooperation abound: 
even international relations, which are often regarded as a field of federal 
competence par excellence, are not inlmune from this kind of pressure. 53 Some 
have even analysed this shift from dualist to cooperative federalism as an 
evolution of the very concept of federalism. 54 
How does all this affect subsidiarity? 
52In other words, the following remarks are not directly linked to the wording of Article 3b, but 
rather to what I regard to be the essence of the concept. This may be one of the reasons why my 
reading of subsidiarity is in sharp contrast with that of Cohen-Tanugi, L 'Europe en danger (1992) 
at 157-169. 
53R. Dehousse, Federalisme et relations intemationales (1991). 
54G. Sawer, Modem Federalism (1976). 
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The answer is simple. Subsidiarity starts from the assumption that one can 
distinguish, in the web of functions assumed by modern states, those that should 
remain within the purview of lower levels, and those which should be fulfilled 
at a higher level. This, as I have tried to show, is no easy task. If we consider 
culture, we will rapidly be faced with the fact that, although culture is generally 
seen as a field where lower levels should be acting, it will not unfrequently take 
the form of an economic good to be traded across national borders. The same 
is true for environmental protection: although it is. of!,e.na matr~rof }ocal 
concern, so;;-~;~-w;;;~·:cid r~;;-th~:d;pl;~~ll.oi t1Ie~2~o11eJayi:r - c~ll for 
u<r, >.<'''"··.::.:~:o·-:::.,.·,.;·~'"··~~--~"':._•.'--~-:--·::~·•;:_o;-,.-~-._-::-_-_--o.o:;::?_;:--:C::·:_·-,--··-· .,_., ··· · ~-- ··.··-··--~·'o."--- ·· 
actiona.tJI};tJfh_ hjg-'~~r J~vels. 
Thus, one sees that, at the institutional level, the main problem is not so 
much to determine in an abstract fashion which authority should exercise a 
given function, but rather to manage interdependence among related areas. A 
provision dealing with free movement of cultural goods will touch both the 
question of free movement - for which action by the centre seems needed -and 
culture - which often belongs to regional competences. One may of course 
choose to ignore the link between these various elements of the problem but, in 
tllis case, whatever solution is likely to give right to conflicts. Forces such as 
technical and economic interdependence or the growth of government 
intervention,55 which often make integration necessary, also make it difficult 
to handle a concept like subsidiarity. 
55It is often stated that government intervention was reduced during the 1980s. This may be true 
as regards intervention in the realm of economic policy. At the same time, however, regulatory 
activities in fields like environmental policy or consumer protection have significantly increased. It 
might therefore be argued that, far from really withdrawing, the state has simply altered its mode of 
intervention. 
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The above analysis seems to suggest that subsidiarity is a somewhat over-
rated concept. Yet, rarely in the past has an institutional question attracted as 
much attention as the subsidiarity debate. This, in itself, is a phenomenon that 
deserve careful consideration. 
Even if the political value of subsidiarity, as a.¥~1leral guideline in favour 
of decentralization, remains, its direct utility as a legal instrument is limited. It 
, o'." ~' ~c: -::;.;,-:-:. ·,--'"; "-'""7~U;;:,.,cc;e:,, tv·~-~':.-. __ ., , 
is doutbtful that, as it currently stands in the Treaty, it could be used directly by 
the Court of Justice. Alternative ways to implement its philosophy are therefore 
needed. 
Although the emphasis has so far been laid on subsidiarity as a principle 
governing the demarcation of competences between the Community and its 
Member States, I would argue that the primary problem is one of process. What 
matters is not only when the Community will act, but also how, and how these 
two deci~ions will b.e made. In ·~th~~ words, specific ~~~h~D±>II'ls ~h~~ict be set 
up to protect the Member States against undue interferences from the 
Community, and to provide cooperation among the various levels of authority 
interested in a given problem. 
Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the subsidiarity debate is in 
itself symptomatic of a mood which has gained strength in reaction to the 
growing importance of the Community. Its introduction in the Treaty should be 
understood as a strong political message: the Mem\)er States are not prepared 
.',iyC-:..,:;c;<..,.;:i.,;) • .,-,::O.:._:c:,~c:...::c.·,-••• • ~-.~, 
to accept an unlimited extension of Community competences. The ratification 
dcl;~tes have p;~.Y'icte~r~pie~v!c.lence·orthe fact that this\riew is - rightly or 
wrongly- shared by large sections of the Community populace. The message 
seems to have been clearly received by its addressees. No matter what has just 
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